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Abstract
The NEDUM-2D model is used to downscale four global socio-economic scenarios at city scale
and simulate the evolution of the Paris urban area between 1900 and 2100. It is based on a dy-
namic extension of the classical urban economic theory, to explain the spatial distribution of
land and real estate values, dwelling surfaces, population density and buildings heights and
density. A validation over the 1900-2010 period shows that the model reproduces available data
and captures the main determinants of city shape evolution. From four global scenarios and ad-
ditional local inputs, 32 local scenarios are created and analyzed. Main drivers of urban sprawl
and climate and flood vulnerability appear to be local demographic growth and local policies;
global factors, such as energy and transport prices, even including possible peak-oil and carbon
taxes, have only a limited influence on them. Conversely, transport-related greenhouse gases
emissions are mainly driven by global factors, namely vehicle efficiency changes, not by land
use. As a consequence, very strict urban policies — including reconstruction — would become
necessary to control emissions from urban transportation if technologies reveal unable to do so.
These scenarios are a useful input for the design and assessment of mitigation and adaptation
policies at local scale.
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1. Introduction
Climate change adds new and unprecedented challenges to urban planning. Urban transport,
land-use, and housing policies are indeed increasingly recognized as major tools for climate
change mitigation (e.g., [1, 2, 3]). At the same time, due to their high concentration in popu-
lation and economic activity, cities are particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, and
their vulnerability is greatly determined by city structure. Urban adaptation policies will thus
need to be developed ([4, 5, 6]).
Downscaling long term global socio-economic scenarios at city scale is useful at the urban
area level, to help local decision-making develop these local adaptation and mitigation policies.
Indeed, using urban planning as a tool for mitigation and adaptation is made extremely difficult
by the high inertia of city built structure ([7, 8]). Anticipated action is required if one wants
cities to be adapted to the climate of the end of the century and to contribute less to global CO2
emissions. But the impacts of policies depend on several external factors: demographic, socio-
economic, cultural, political and technological changes will play a major role. For instance,
success of strategies aiming at reducing transport energy consumption is dependent on future
transport prices. Prospective studies that explore various possible evolutions of these variables
are thus required to design the best policies.
This exercise is also useful on a global scale, as scenarios on the evolution of urban forms
would also be relevant for the building of long-term narratives of future greenhouse gases emis-
sions ([9, 10, 11, 12]), and future climate change vulnerability ([13, 14]).
A growing body of literature is now trying to establish such long term scenarios (often
until 2100) at city scale and related to global environmental change for climate change impacts
or mitigation analysis ([15, 9, 16, 17, 18, 19]). Such long-term scenarios related to global
environmental change are different from traditional city scenarios designed to support urban
planning, which generally consider time horizons of 30 years or less and are not connected to
global scenarios, in which global environmental change can be represented (cf. for instance
[20, 21], or studies listed in [22]).
In our study, the NEDUM-2D model3 is used to simulate the evolution of the Paris urban
area between 1900 and 2100. It uses a dynamic extension of the classical urban economic theory
to explain the spatial distribution of land and real estate values, dwelling surfaces, population
density and buildings heights and density. A validation over the 1900-2010 period shows that
the model reproduces fairly faithfully the available data and captures the main determinants
of city shape evolution, suggesting that this tool can be used to inform policy decisions. Our
approach is, a priori, applicable to most urban areas where data is available.
In Section 2, we briefly present our model and its equations. Section 3 presents the results
of the model calibration and its validation over past evolution of Paris urban area. Section
4 describes the hypotheses that have been used in our scenarios. Section 5 investigates the
results of our simulations, and draw general conclusions regarding climate change mitigation
3Source code available upon request.
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and adaptation. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Modelling urban growth
Although models are highly simplified descriptions of reality, they are useful to create
prospective scenarios. By enabling decision makers and stakeholders to understand the main
mechanisms and interactions between variables, they can create a basis for policy discussion. It
should be highlighted that prospective scenarios do not “predict” the future. They are possible
and coherent scenarios, which represent conceivable futures in the spirit of the SRES scenarios
([23, 24]). Prospective scenarios can fuel the debates about Paris future and inform policy-
making, but they have no predictive value.
Several methods can be used to create scenarios for urban development and extensive re-
views of land-use change models exist (for examples, see [22, 25]). One first set of methods
extrapolates past tendencies: it studies past evolution of the city to anticipate its future. Models
can rely on statistical regressions (see for instance [26]), Markov chains or cellular automata
(see for instance [9]). A second set of methods proposes to model main evolution drivers, es-
pecially land-use transport interaction (see [27], for a review). The main disadvantage of this
method is that many phenomena are neglected : the outcome is only an approximation of reality.
The main advantage is that the simulations are easily understandable, as is the influence of each
parameter, and that these models are based on mechanisms that are supposed to remain valid in
the future, while past-trends extrapolation is always questionable.
This analysis is based on such a model of city evolution. To produce scenarios going until
the end of the century, it uses only general and fundamental economic principles, which are
likely to remain constant over the long term.
The model we use here, NEDUM-2D, is able to capture the dynamics of urban systems,
and the importance of inertia. It is based on a model developed in Gusdorf and Hallegatte
[7, 28], Gusdorf et al. [8], Viguié and Hallegatte [29, 30], Viguié [31]. It is a dynamic model
which relies on the classical urban economics framework, an economic modeling approach
developed since the end of the 1960s ([32, 33, 34]) which explains the spatial distribution —
across the city — of the costs of land and of real estate, housing surface, population density and
buildings heights and density.
As explained in Gusdorf et al. [8], urban economics has been mostly used to explore the
characteristics of long run equilibriums. However, the existence of urban stationary equilibri-
ums is questionable: when population, transport prices, or income vary, housing infrastructure
cannot adapt rapidly to changing conditions and is always out of equilibrium. Our model takes
explicitly into account this dynamics and describes cities as non-equilibrium systems.
A complete description of the model, with the full set of equations, is available in Appendix
A. It is based on three main mechanisms.
First, we suppose that households choose their accommodation location and size by making
a trade-off between the time and money they spend in transport (i.e. to commute to their jobs)
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and the real estate price level (or, equivalently, between the proximity to the city center and the
housing surface they can afford).
Second, real estate developers choose to build more or less housing (i.e. larger or smaller
building) at a specific location, depending on the local level of real estate prices. When these
prices are low, developers tend to build low density buildings, and when these prices are high,
they tend to build high density buildings.
Third, we suppose that various city characteristics do not evolve and adjust at the same
speed. For instance, rents can evolve very quickly, whereas buildings change with a much
longer timescale. Building depreciation is also very low, leading to path dependency and lock-
ins in city evolution.
Using these mechanisms, it is possible to determine the structure of the city from informa-
tion on population size, households’ income, transport network location, building construction
costs and developers behavior parameters.
Let us present briefly two classical results of urban economics which are of relevance for
our analysis.4 These results are still valid in our modeling. The first is that variation of real
estate prices across the urban area is uniquely determined by transport generalized prices. An
increase in transport price (or a decrease in transport speed) results in a steeper decrease in real
estate prices with distance from the center. Developers react to this change, and population
density tends to increase, or decrease, where real estate prices respectively increase or decrease.
Conversely, a decrease of transport prices makes real estate prices decrease less steeply with
distance, i.e. real estate prices become more homogeneous in the city. Developers also react to
this change, and population density becomes more homogeneous, too.
Secondly, if transport generalized price enables to compute variation of real estate prices
across the urban area, the overall level of real estate prices is mostly determined by available
ground space and by the number of inhabitants. Let us suppose for instance that available
ground space decreases, or that the city population increases. In this case, according to urban
economic theory, real estate prices will increase everywhere. Because of this increase, develop-
ers will build more, and population density will increase everywhere (until all the population can
be accommodated). It should be highlighted that, in this case, if transport generalized prices do
not change, the relative distribution of real estate prices across the urban area does not change.
In this case, all real estate prices increase or decrease by the same amount, everywhere in the
urban area.
A combination of transport prices decrease and available ground space decrease leads both
to an increase of average real estate prices level, and to more homogeneous real estate prices.
Real estate price variation in the center of the city can therefore be either positive or nega-
tive, according to the relative magnitude of the transport price decrease and the ground space
decrease.
4For a detailed analysis of urban economic framework see Fujita [35].
4
3. Calibration and Validation
3.1. Model hypotheses
This section summarizes the model calibration.
First, we suppose that there exists a unique city center. If, rigorously speaking, recent trends
in Paris urban area development seem to contradict this assumption, it is still reasonable to ac-
cept it, at least in first approximation, as can be seen in Section 3.4 : rents and population density
reach a peak at a point that corresponds to the center of Paris and decrease in all directions on a
regular basis when one moves away. High job density near the center of Paris5 and Paris urban
area star-shaped public transport network, which means that a large fraction of people working
outside the center have to go through the center to commute, also contribute to the relevance of
the monocentric approach. Results presented below confirm that the monocentric assumption
is still able to explain the major characteristics of the Paris urban area up to now.
For a question of simplicity and clarity, we have developed scenarios in which the urban
area keeps evolving in a monocentric way. This prevents from analyzing some possible fu-
ture developments, especially if Paris urban area becomes more polycentric than it actually is.6
As for all following hypotheses, this should be considered as a selection of a set of scenarios
among many possible others. Based on the numerous theoretical frameworks which have been
proposed to account for decentralized production and to incorporate amenities (see for instance
[36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43]), we introduce in an on-going study a tendency towards poly-
centrism in the model, by modelling firms (and employment) location choices. However these
theoretical extensions are not included in the present analysis.
Second, this model only is based on market mechanisms. In practice, because of urbanism
constraints (e.g. limits to building heights) and of direct public investment (e.g. in public
housing or infrastructure), the structure of the Paris urban area does not directly correspond to
the resulting balance of the free play of market. We introduce explicitly constraints of this type
in the model: we limite the height of buildings in Paris and forbid to build in some areas (natural
parks, public gardens...). We do not describe direct public investment aiming at changing the
urban shape. For instance, “Villes nouvelles” (“new towns”)7 are an historic example of a
planned urban development that the model is not able to anticipate. Thus, the model provides
spontaneous urbanization trends, that urban policy may alter.
5For instance, 60% of all jobs of Paris urban area administrative region (Île de France) lie within 12km from
the center of Paris, i.e. in a circle with an area representing less than 4% of Île de France area. (Source: INSEE)
6Many possible changes could actually favor such an evolution : (1) major development of telecommuting
would change the housing patterns (people may decide to live much further if they do not have to commute every-
day); (2) change in infrastructure patterns with a new network that is not star-shaped (this is unlikely considering
the legacy of current infrastructure and planned investments); (3) changes in transport technologies, such as the
driverless car (which could lead to less or more sprawl depending on how it is used); (4) population aging that may
increase the fraction of the population that does not work and does not have to commute everyday.
7These new towns were created from scratch in France in the mid-1960s to try to control the expansion of
several cities. For example Cergy-Pontoise, Marne-la-Vallée, Sénart, Évry and Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines were
created around Paris.
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We also exclude social housing from our study, because it is strongly regulated and do
not follow market forces. Since the access to social housing is constrained in practice8, we
assume that the existence of social housing has a limited influence on the private market. More
precisely, we assume that households cannot make social housing and private housing compete,
which would result in a reduction of private real estate prices until they become comparable to
social housing prices.
Given the level of abstraction and the exploratory nature of this work, we have here ne-
glected the local distribution of household income. One obvious development of this study is
the introduction of the households heterogeneity (including income differences) in the analysis.
3.2. Data and coefficients
All data and coefficients used in the simulations are summed up in Appendix B. To com-
pute generalized transport prices, we used data about walking times, actual transport times and
prices in public transport (underground, regional trains and suburban trains) and private trans-
port (during rush hours, for an average car). At each location, the generalized transport cost is
computed for each transport mode, and a logit weighting is used to compute the modal shares.9
In the simulations, changes in public and private transport prices lead therefore to modal shifts.
We suppose in the simulations that construction costs and value of time evolve, over time,
proportionally to households average income. This a strong hypothesis, with important impli-
cations on model results (cf. Section 5.1).
Concerning the cost of time, our hypothesis is coherent with the relevant literature (see for
instance [45]). However, it should be noted that technological innovations that make travel
more comfortable reduce the cost of time (i.e. the monetary equivalent of spending one minute
in traveling, expressed as a fraction of the hourly net wage). Therefore, a constant trend towards
more comfortable means of transport would result in a cost of time increasing less than propor-
tionally to income. Empirical studies have captured this phenomenon ([46]). Here, we neglect
this phenomenon (cf. Section 5.1 for a discussion of the consequences).
It proves difficult to find analyses of long term evolution of construction costs over time.
To the authors’ knowledge, no data exist in the relevant literature. If construction price indexes
are measured in many countries, they are generally measured for constant-quality dwelling, and
do not take into account the evolution of preferences and construction norms. It is therefore
difficult to assess how construction costs have evolved in the past. We suppose that these costs
evolve proportionally to households income.
3.3. Urban area evolution
As can be seen on Fig. 1(d), the model reproduces well the current Paris urban area. The
main mismatch is in the west (Mantes la Jolie) and in the south of the urban area (Melun), where
8In 2007, for instance, only about 7% of demand for social housing in Île de France was fulfilled ([44]).
9More rigorously, at each location, the logit weighting is computed on each price divided by the minimum price
at this location.
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(a) 1900 (b) 1960
(c) 1982 (d) 2008
Figure 1: Simulated urbanized area compared to actual urbanized area. Actual urban area appears in black (Source:
IAU, MOS database), whereas model simulation appears in transparent green.
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the model does not capture observed urbanized areas. These two zones correspond to cities
which were built long before being included in Paris urban area, and are important employment
centers on their own, whereas the model only represents built areas due to Paris urban area
sprawl.
It is possible to use this model to simulate city evolution from 1900 to 2008. For instance,
Fig. 1(a), Fig. 1(b) and Fig. 1(c) compare simulated urban area with actual urbanized area,
in 1900, 1960 and 1982, respectively. Because of the lack of data, we used the same transport
network as in 2008 to do these three simulations, and the description of the city in 1900 is not as
good as for the following years10. However, large-scale trends between 1900 and 2008 are well
described, suggesting that the model captures the main determinants of city shape evolution.
3.4. Internal city structure
As shown in Fig. 2(a) the model describes the distribution of rents across the city in 2008
satisfactorily. In two dimensions, the model explains 51.8% of the variance in rents. When all
areas at a given distance from the center are averaged, the model explains 89.5% of the uni-
dimensional variance. Figure 2(b) shows that there is also a good agreement between the model
and data in terms of population density. The model explains 77.2% of the two-dimensional
variance in population density, and 95.9% of the uni-dimensional variance. Similarly, Fig. 3(a)
shows a reasonable agreement in terms of dwelling size, even though we have little data on this
aspect. Finally, Fig. 3(b) shows that this agreement holds over time, at least since the 1980’s.
Model and data seem to match well on the urban area scale, even if local differences can be
large, due to the lack of several locally-important characteristics (e.g., public services supply
and local amenities).
4. Scenario hypotheses
4.1. World evolution scenarios
We use a set of four contrasted scenarios on world evolutions, based on several hypotheses
on world population growth, fossil fuel reserves, technology availability and climate policies
(Fig. 4). These hypotheses are used as input by the Imaclim-R model ([47]) to compute coherent
quantitative techno-economic global scenarios on income, transport prices and technologies
over the 2010-2100 period.
Imaclim-R is a global hybrid general equilibrium model with endogeneous technical change.
It represents the world economy, disaggregated into 12 regions and 12 sectors. The model is
hybrid in the sense that it combines macroeconomic consistency with technology explicitness.
Moreover, this framework encompasses second-best features: the possible underutilization of
production factors (labour and capital), the interplay between technological inertia and imper-
fect foresight (the price signals incorporated in adaptive expectations is a function of current
10For instance, bus and tramway networks are not modeled, whereas they were of great importance at the
beginning of the 20th century.
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(a) Rents (Data source: CLAMEUR). The model
explains 55.1% of the two-dimensional variance of
the data.
(b) Population density (Data source: INSEE). The
model explains 74.7% of the two-dimensional vari-
ance of the data.
Figure 2: Rents and population density computed by the model (green area) and from data. Dots represent data for
individual localities. The dotted line represents the average value of data at a given distance from Paris center.
(a) Dwelling size in 2006 (Data source: INSEE and
IAU)
(b) Average dwelling size evolution (Data source:
INSEE and IAU)
Figure 3: Dwelling size computed by the model (plain line) and from data.
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Figure 4: Global techno-economic scenarios
prices and past trends), and the rigidities of labor markets. It simulates for instance energy
prices, technology market penetrations, energy production, and transport technology prices.
Main determinants of these variables include future fossil fuel availability and future cli-
mate policies. The four scenarios were computed by combining (1) two assumptions on future
tensions on fossil fuel markets and (2) two assumptions on future world climate policies (see a
detailed presentation of the model and of the scenarios in [47]; these two worlds are part of the
576 worlds designed for this article).
Assumptions on future tensions on fossil fuel markets result from a combinaison of hy-
pothesis on exogenous parameters of the model describing natural resources, technologies and
international economic trends. They include parameters describing oil and gas markets, the
Middle-East strategy, coal markets, the availability of alternative liquid fuel supply, carbon free
options for power generation and end-use technologies, and development patterns.
These parameters have been combined to maximize the difference in energy and transport
prices in 2050 in these two worlds. In scenarios LN and LY (cf. Fig. 4), fossil fuels are
largely available until 2040 (for instance the amount of ultimately recoverable oil resources is
3.6 Tb) while demand is high and locked in carbon-intensive pathways (development pathways
are energy-intensive and the potential for low-carbon technologies is low; for instance elec-
tric vehicles cannot significantly penetrate the market). In scenarios SN and SY, the peak oil
happens before 2030 (the amount of ultimately recoverable oil resources is 3.1 Tb) while the
potential for low-carbon technologies is high (e.g. electric vehicles can penetrate the market as
soon as 2010) and demand is less carbon-intensive. Appendix D gives a full description of all
parameters values used in these two assumptions.
For climate policies, the model simulates either (i) a “Business As Usual” (BAU) world
with no constraint on emissions (scenarios SN and LN), or (ii) a “stabilization” world in which
a global carbon price reduces emissions such that CO2 concentration is stabilized at 450 ppm in
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the long run (corresponding to a 550 ppm CO2eq. stabilization)(scenarios LY and SY).
Figure 6 shows some variables of the resulting techno-economic scenarios, and Fig. 5 shows
the associated oil prices and carbon tax11. Imaclim-R computes the evolution of vehicles usage
costs. In our scenarios, we suppose that public transport prices evolve proportionally to public
transport usage cost, i.e. that the fraction of subsidy in public transport cost remains constant.
In the Imaclim-R model the oil price is endogenous. As the model is calibrated on the 2001
GTAP database and disregards some of the mechanisms driving market oil price (especially
geopolitical tensions, the impact of changes in exchange rates, and market speculation), the
steep increase of oil prices which happened before 2008 is not reproduced, and the oil price
remains around 80$/bl until 2015 (see Fig. 5(a)).
In techno-economic scenarios LN and LY, fossil fuels are largely available until 2040, and
there is a limited potential for low-carbon technologies. The large availability of oil maintains
low prices for the first thirteen years of the projected period. Then, a steep twenty-year-long
surge in oil prices begins just before oil production starts to decrease (i.e., before the peak
oil; see Fig. 5(a)) and brings the oil price up to 450$/bl. This surge is triggered by a tension
between high demand, which cannot be reduced overnight, and constraints on the deployment of
oil substitutes (e.g. vehicles electrification). This is the logical outcome of a small potential for
low-carbon technologies combined with low energy prices in the first period. These low prices
(a) induce intensive energy consumption, (b) cause faster exhaustion and a sharper decline of
conventional oil, and (c) deter investment in non-conventional production capacities and limit
their availability in the post-Peak Oil period. From 2040 on, the surge in oil prices is sufficient
to trigger energy efficiency and technical change towards low-carbon technologies, so that oil
demand starts declining and the oil price goes back down to around 350$/bl. In scenario LY,
this technical change is sufficient to meet the climate target with a relatively low carbon tax
until 2080. After 2080 though, the climate target becomes more stringent and the carbon tax
has to increase steeply so as to tackle the most inert sectors of the Imaclim-R model (see Fig.
5(b)). As a consequence, the oil price drops to about 200$/bl because oil demand decreases in
the transportation sector.
The steep increase in oil price between 2040 and 2080, in scenarios LN and LY, is translated
into the cost of private vehicles transport and public transport (see Fig. 6), but to a lesser extent.
This is due to a rapid turnover in the stock of private vehicles, which can be replaced in ten years
by more efficient vehicles and hybrids, and to the fact that public transports include a large part
of electric technologies.
In techno-economic scenarios SN and SY, a weak Peak oil happens before 2030 and the
potential for low-carbon technologies is high. In that case, oil demand is lower in the short-run
than in scenarios LN and LY, preventing a strong peak oil in the 2040’s. But from 2040 on, oil
price increases continuously in scenario SN, until it reaches 500$/bl in 2100 (see Fig. 5(a)).
11Oil prices and carbon tax are not directly used as inputs by NEDUM-2D. Only transport prices for individual
car and public transport (Fig. 6(a) and 6(b)), income evolution (Fig. 6(c)) and average vehicle fuel consumption
(Fig. 13(d)) are used in our simulations.
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(a) Oil price (excluding carbon tax). (b) Carbon tax in scenarios SY and LY.
Figure 5: Oil price and carbon tax computed by Imaclim-R model in the four scenarios. The carbon tax is applied
everywhere around the world, and is computed so that CO2 concentration is stabilized at 450 ppm in the long run
(corresponding to a 550 ppm CO2eq. stabilization). There is no carbon tax in Techno-economic scenarios SN and
LN.
This regular increase is due to the decrease in oil production, combined with high potential for
technical change towards low-carbon technologies. This high potential prevents the economies
from being locked in very oil-intensive technologies (as in scenario LN), so that there is no
surge in oil price when Peak Oil is reached. However this regular increase in oil price is not
sufficient to meet the climate target, so in scenario SY the carbon tax rises sharply to tackle the
most inert sectors of the model (see Fig. 5(b)). As a consequence of this high carbon price, the
oil price falls below 50$/bl after 2060 in this scenario.
The high potential for decarbonisation in the scenarios SN and SY (e.g. in terms of elec-
trification of vehicles) is translated into constant costs for private and public transportation in
scenario SN, and a decreasing cost in scenario SY (see Fig. 6). This decreasing cost is due to
a high penetration of electric vehicles in the park, as well as electricity decarbonisation, which
are triggered by the carbon tax sharp and regular increase.
In these four scenarios, private vehicle usage cost per km, public transport usage cost per
km and household income simulated by Imaclim-R model for the “Europe” region are used to
drive NEDUM model simulations (for more information, Appendix C details the link between
the data emerging from Imaclim-R model and the NEDUM-2D model).
4.2. Local scenarios
These global inputs are not sufficient to create local-scale scenarios, which depend on many
other factors. In particular, several local inputs are also needed.
Paris urban area population evolution and households size. As inputs for population evolution
and households size, we used two demographic scenarios (Fig. 7). The Low one is based,
for the 2010-2030 period, on a scenario produced by the French national statistical institute
(INSEE) and by the urbanism institute of Ile de France (IAU) for Paris urban area ([49]). For
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(a) Average cost to drive 1km in private vehicle, in-
cluding electric vehicles and carbon tax (Source for
historical data: F. Nadaud ([48]), after CPDP)
(b) Monthly cost of basic public transport pass (or
equivalent), including carbon tax (Source for histor-
ical data: F. Nadaud ([48]), after RATP)
(c) Average annual household disposable income.
The curves for scenarios SY and LY are almost iden-
tical. Source for historical data: J. Friggit, CGEDD
after INSEE∗.
Figure 6: Example of inputs from Imaclim-R model. Scenarios SN and SY represent a world with high resilience
against fossil fuel tensions. Scenarios LN and LY represent a world with high peak oil, happening in 2040.
Scenarios SN and LN represent a world without any global climatic policy, contrary to scenarios LY and SY.
∗Series downloadable on
www.cgedd.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=138.
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Figure 7: Demographic scenarios : number of households in Paris urban area. Source for historical data: INSEE.
the 2030-2050 period, it is based on a scenario produced by INSEE for France ([50]), and for
the 2050-2100 period by a scenario produced by the UN for Europe ([51]). The High scenario
is the same as the Low scenario until 2050, and is then constant.
Development of transport infrastructure. Many different assumptions about the future develop-
ment of transport infrastructure can be tested with the model. For simplicity, we suppose here
that infrastructure pattern remains unchanged between 2010 and 2100, and that congestion on
roads and public transport remains at current levels, i.e. future investments in the transportation
network are assumed to maintain the same service level in spite of population growth, without
developing new lines.
Urbanism policies. We use four different scenarios for local urban policies. In the first one, we
suppose that the extension of the city is entirely guided by the market: we introduce no policy
or regulation limiting the extension of the city or preferentially developing certain areas. The
idea is to study the "natural" trend of development of the city; this trend does not necessarily
match the development that will occur in practice, but it allows understanding and anticipating
land pressures, and therefore future local challenges.
In the second one, we suppose that an efficient “Green Belt policy” is enacted in 2020 to
control urban sprawl and protect natural areas and agriculture activity. From that year on, build-
ing is only possible through a densification of existing built spaces, but is prohibited elsewhere.
In the third one, we suppose that a zoning policy to reduce the risk of flooding is imple-
mented in 2020. This policy prohibits new constructions in flood-prone areas, but do not act on
existing buildings.
Finally, in the fourth one, we suppose that both a flood-risk zoning policy and a green-belt
policy are implemented together, in a policy that combines adaptation and mitigation objectives.
5. Results
Model results can be analyzed in view of three policy goals: reducing urban sprawl, miti-
gating climate change, and adapting to it.
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Figure 8: Example of simulated urban area extension, using techno-economic scenario SN and high demographic
scenario.
5.1. Urban sprawl
Figure 8 presents an example of projected Paris urban area extension between 2010 and
2100. This example corresponds to a techno-economic scenario with a limited and early peak
oil, no global climate policy to curb world greenhouse gas emissions (techno-economic sce-
nario SN) and a demographic scenario where Paris urban area population grows until 2050, and
then remains constant (high demographic scenario). In this scenario, Paris urban area expands
greatly, especially between 2010 and 2030.
Changing these hypotheses changes the simulated expansion, but all factors do not have
the same impact. Figure 9 shows a simulation with the same techno-economic hypotheses, but
with a decreasing population between 2050 and 2100 (the low demographic scenario). In this
case, some urban locations are abandonned (which could lead to city management problems,
as observed for instance in eastern european shrinking cities, see Bontje [52]). However, other
locations continue to be developped between 2050 and 2100, in spite of the decrease in pop-
ulation. This is due to the decrease in transport costs relative to income, and the subsequent
population density decrease.
Techno-economic considerations seem to affect only moderately urban sprawl when com-
pared with the impact of urbanism policies, and population changes (see Fig. 10). Even the
presence of a carbon tax (at the value needed to stabilize CO2 concentration at 450 ppm, i.e.
about $1000) does not influence significantly urban sprawl.
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Figure 9: Example of simulated urban area extension, using techno-economic scenario SN and low demographic
scenario.
Figure 10: Urban area extension as simulated by NEDUM-2D. Plain green curves correspond to scenarios with a
high population (for the four global scenarios), and blue ones to scenarios with low population, with no green belt
policy in both cases. The dashed curve correspond to scenarios with the green belt policy.
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This result has two origins. Firstly, it is caused by our world scenarios: in these scenarios,
an important "peak oil" and a high carbon tax impact moderately transport prices (the maximum
increase is about 20%) , because they are compensated by vehicle energy consumption decrease
and alternative energy use (especially electric vehicles and decarbonized electricity in the case
of scenarios with a climate policy and liquefied coal in the other scenarios).
Secondly, in our model, households respond to a generalized cost of transport, which is the
sum of the actual monetary cost of transportation, plus a cost associated to travel time. To com-
pute the latter, as explained in Section 3.2, we use a cost of time which increases proportionally
to households income. In all the simulations computed by the Imaclim-R model, households
income increases strongly (almost exponentially) over time (Fig. 6(c)), whereas transport mon-
etary cost increases only moderately (Fig. 6(a) and 6(b)). Therefore, in all scenarios, transport
monetary cost becomes gradually negligible compared to transport time cost (Tab. 1). As trans-
portation times are the same in all our scenarios, the differences between scenarios tend to
decrease.
Year 2010 2050 2100
Monetary cost (e 2000) 1,070 1,210 1,150
Fraction of generalized cost 9.79% 5.31% 2.15%
Time cost cost (e 2000) 9,870 21,580 52,240
Fraction of generalized cost 90.21% 94.69% 97.85%
Table 1: Comparison between transport monetary cost and cost associated to transport time, in average, 20km from
the center of Paris. Cost associated to transport time appears to be about 10 times higher than transport monetary
cost in 2010. This ratio increases over time.
As highlighted in Section 3.1, there are some empirical and theoretical evidences that time
cost may not evolve proportionally to income , because of technological innovations that make
travel more comfortable.12 The elasticity of time cost relative to income variation may be as low
as 0.5 ([46]). But it should be noted that, even in this case, in the simulations, costs associated
with transportation times increase much more over the century than monetary transport costs,
and that urban sprawl remains marginally impacted by energy prices.
This result suggests especially that climate policies based on a carbon price aiming at lim-
iting global emissions would only have a marginal impact on urban forms. Other policies are
needed to slow down urban sprawl. Examples of these policies include specific land-use policies
(urban planning regulations such as the green belt policy modelled here, but also other policies
such as local taxes), or direct investments in transport which would change travel times across
the urban area. This result is consistent with Viguié and Hallegatte [29], which concluded that
a 100e /tC carbon tax alone seemed unsufficient to mitigate urban sprawl.
12It may also seem reasonable to imagine a scenario where an increasing transport congestion would make travel
less comfortable. In such a scenario, time cost would increase more rapidly than income.
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Figure 11: Average dwelling size evolution. Green curves correspond to scenarios with a high population, and blue
ones to scenarios with low population. The dotted black line corresponds to actual historic data (Source : INSEE
and IAU).
Of course, techno-economic scenarios with a lower income growth, or even with an income
stagnation or decrease could lead to different conclusions.
5.2. Mitigation
All scenarios predict a growth in dwelling size, coherent with historical trends (Fig. 11).
This growth appears to be mainly impacted by the existence or not of a greenbelt policy: when
such a policy is implemented, increased land scarcity leads to an increase in real estate prices,
and hence to smaller dwellings13. However, in all scenarios, transport cost decreases relatively
to income. This enables people to locate more and more uniformly in the urban area (Section 2),
thus reducing real estate pressure, and counterbalancing the former mechanism. Consequently,
even when a greenbelt policy is implemented, dwelling size appears to increase over time (al-
though less quickly than when no green belt policy is implemented). Such an increase could
have an impact on greenhouse gases emissions, through an increase in energy consumption for
heating or cooling.
The green belt enables also to mitigate public transport modal share decrease (Fig. 12).
However, it does not appear sufficient to prevent this decrease, which happens for all scenarios.
As shown in Fig. 13, if transport-related emissions are impacted by many variables, the main
influence comes from techno-economic scenarios, i.e. fuel prices and transport technologies
13In practice, this could also lead to a reduced city attractivity, and therefore to a smaller population than in the
scenarios with no greenbelt policy (in the line of [53]). This could indirectly impact average dwelling size. In our
simulations, demographic scenarios are exogeneous, so we could not study such phenomena.
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Figure 12: Public transport modal share for commuting trips. Actual data for 2002 is 46.63 % (Source : DREIF).
evolution. The average distance traveled using private car (strongly related in our modelling to
city sprawl) is greatly impacted by the implementation of a greenbelt policy, because of a modal
shift towards public transport14, and because of the reduced length of trips. However, in terms of
greenhouse gases emissions, this has a much lower effect that the variation in vehicle efficiency
and technology from the socio-economic scenario (e.g. availability of electric vehicles and
decarbonized electricity).
In our downscaled scenarios, therefore, transport-related greenhouse gas emissions in the
city are mainly driven by technologies. With the urban policies we have tested, urban planning
plays a limited role in spite of its influence on the distance traveled by car. It means that
if technologies cannot contribute to emission reductions, then limiting emissions from urban
transportation would require the implementation of urban planning options that are much stricter
than what has been investigated in this article. In practice, since a green belft would not be
sufficient, it means that urban reconstruction, i.e. a combination of building destruction and
construction, would become necessary.
5.3. Adaptation
These scenarios are also useful for climate change adaptation and vulnerability analyzes
([54]). In Paris, one of the main disaster risks is flooding, and climate change may increase
this risk, even though models still disagree. Figure 14 shows how population living in flood-
14The densification of the urban area makes a larger fraction of the inhabitants live close to public transport
stations.
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(a) Transport-related emissions per household (b) Total transport-related emissions
(c) Average yearly distance traveled using private
car,per household
(d) Average private vehicle emissions per
passenger-km. Average over all circulating private
cars. Public transport emissions are much smaller,
about 4.10−4 tCO2/100km or less in all scenarios.
Figure 13: Transport-related emissions.
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prone areas15 can be expected to evolve in the future. This data is an essential input to assess
how changes in rainfall may translate into flood losses, and therefore to assess climate change
impacts. The simulated population living in flood-prone areas is consistent with observations
(empirical estimations for 1999 and 2006 are presented on Fig. 14). In all scenarios, this pop-
ulation increases until 2030 before decreasing slowly. This decrease is related to a diminishing
population density in risk zones.
It should be noted that a greenbelt policy appears to increase the number of households
living in flood-prone areas (Fig. 14(a)), because it increases population density in flood-prone
area. Such a phenomenon has been observed empirically by Burby et al. [55] and Lall and
Deichmann [56]. This negative side-effect should be balanced with the positive effect on urban
sprawl and transport demand (see [30], for a more detailed study of such trade-offs).
This conclusion is true even when a flood-risk zoning is implemented (Fig. 14(b)), i.e. even
when new buildings in flood-exposed zones are forbidden. Indeed, we suppose here that this
policy prevents new buildings in places not already urbanized, but does not prevent densifi-
cation in places already built. As explained in Section 5.2, dwelling size is smaller when a
greenbelt policy is implemented, and more people are therefore living in flood-risk zones in
these scenarios.
As can be seen on Fig. 14(b), the “flood risk zoning policy” that we have considered here has
a weak impact on flood risk, when compared to other variables. Here, again, as for mitigation,
urban planning plays a limited role, and to reach a significant impact it requires strong measure
going beyond what is usually done ([57]).
Heat wave vulnerability is another important topic strongly related to urban extension. To
investigate this topic, three on-going research projects16 are coupling this urban model with the
urban microclimate model TEB ([58]).
6. Conclusion
NEDUM-2D captures the main long-term determinants of city evolution; it is able to re-
produce the main tendencies of past Paris urban area evolution. From global socio-economic
scenarios, it enables to derive local scenarios for the Paris urban area. These scenarios appear
useful to support decision-making about urban sprawl, emissions reduction policies and climate
change adaptation.
The main conclusions of this study are not the quantitative figures computed in the scenarios,
but the relative orders of magnitude and the qualitative reasons explaining them (tab. C.1 sums
up key results). Firstly, transport price considerations seem to affect only moderately urban
15We used present-day flood-prone areas (Source: CARTO RISQUE, French Ministry of environment MED-
DTL). This analysis could be made more refined by coupling the urban model with an hydrological model to take
into account the impacts of climate change on the frequency and intensity of floods.
16VURCA, MUSCADE and ACCLIMAT projects (http://www.cnrm.meteo.fr/ville.climat/
?lang=en).
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(a) Green curves correspond to scenarios with a
high population, and blue ones to scenarios with
low population. Dotted lines correspond to scenar-
ios with no green belt policy, and plain ones to sce-
narios with a green belt policy.
(b) Green curves correspond to scenarios with flood
risk zoning, and blue ones to scenarios without.
Figure 14: Number of households living in flood-prone areas, as simulated by NEDUM-2D. The dotted black
line corresponds to actual historic data (Source: French Ministry of environment MEDDTL (CGDD/SOeS), after
Corine Land Cover and CARTO RISQUE databases).
Urban
sprawl
Mitigation Adaptation
(flood risk)
Population change H l H
Urban containment policy H l H
Techno-economic scenarios (trans-
port prices and technologies)
l H l
Flood risk zoning l l l
Table 2: Main conclusions: impact of variables on main objectives. H stands for pour “high impact” and l for
“low impact”. The “flood risk zoning policy” that we have considered here does not prevent densification in places
already urbanized. It has therefore a weak impact on flood risk, when compared to other variables.
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sprawl when compared with the impact of population changes and urbanism policies. Even
the presence of a carbon tax (at the value needed to stabilize CO2 concentration at 450 ppm)
does not influence it significantly. In other words, possible future increases in fuel prices seem
insufficient to slow suburbanization, and other measures are needed if one wants to slow down
urban sprawl. Examples of these measures include specific land-use policies (urban planning
regulations, local taxes), or direct investments in transport infrastructure.
A second conclusion is that, conversely, techno-economic scenarios (and especially vehi-
cle efficiency) play the major role concerning commuting transport-related greenhouse gases
emissions. The reason behind that is, that, in all scenarios, the variation in transport demand,
when demography changes or when a green belt policy is implemented, appears to be smaller
than the expected variation in vehicle efficiency. Only a much stricter anti-sprawl urbanism
policy or much more contrasted demographic scenarios would ultimately be able to change this
conclusion. One important consequence of this result is that the urban policies needed to limit
emissions from urban transportation are highly dependent on the technologies that will even-
tually be available. If technology is unable to achieve sufficient emissions control, then very
strict constraints on urban development, more than the green belt policy tested here, will be
necessary. A re-engineering of the city, its buildings and infrastructure may even be required.
The third conclusion is about climate change adaptation: concerning flood-risk, the popula-
tion living in flood-prone areas increases in all scenarios until 2030, before decreasing slowly.
This decrease is related to a diminishing population density in risk zones. A greenbelt policy
appears to increase the number of households living in flood-prone areas, because it increases
the population density. This is true even when a flood-risk zoning is implemented, i.e. when
new building in flood-exposed zones is forbidden.
As our modeling is monocentric, it was not possible to simulate the effect of an increased
development of other subcenters in the urban area. Such a development would result in alterna-
tive scenarios. However, the mechanisms leading to the main conclusions of this paper do not
depend on the city being monocentric or not, and should remain valid in a polycentric setting. A
more complex, polycentric model is under development and will be useful to test the influence
of other new variables, and especially investment in services supply (schools, health, leisure...)
across the urban area.
Techno-economic scenarios with a lower income growth, or even with an income stagnation
or decrease could lead to different conclusions. We have only downscaled a small number of
scenarios in this study : to assess the robustness of the former results, other scenarios should be
downscaled. More systematic exploration of the impact of the variation of global scenarios is
also an important part of our research agenda.
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Appendix A. Description of NEDUM-2D model
This appendix sets up the formal representation of the mechanisms described in Section 2.
Appendix A.1. Utility function
As in [29], we model the household trade-off using the following utility function:
U(r) = Z(r)αq(r)β (A.1)
where r is the location in the city, α and β are coefficients (α + β = 1), q(r) the surface of
the households’ dwelling and Z(r) the money remaining after the household has paid its rent
and a commuting round-trip per day to the center of Paris. The cost of transportation includes
the monetary cost of transportation and the cost associated with the trip duration17. Such a
functional form is consistent with the fact that the share of households’ income devoted to
housing expenditures is relatively constant ([59]). Households’ income constraint reads:
Y = Z(r) + q(r) ·R(r) + T (r) (A.2)
where Y is household income and is constant (∀r, Y (r) = Y ), R(r) is the rent per square meter,
and T (r) transportation costs (monetary cost added with time cost).
Appendix A.2. Housing service per household
We assume that households permanently adapt their housing-service consumption to prices
so as to increase their utility level to prices. Given the location r, the amount of composite
goods consumed is strictly dependent on housing choices: Z(r) = Y − T (r)− q(r) ·R(r). We
have, therefore:
U(r) = [Y − T (r)− q(r) ·R(r)]α · q(r)β (A.3)
Using this function, we consider that households can adjust their level of housing service
consumption so as to improve their utility level : taking rent level R(r) as given, households
increase or decrease the size of their flats so as to maximize their utility. Adjustment in housing
service consumption per capita can also include changes in the size and composition of house-
holds, for example through changes in flat-sharing practices, or changes in the age at which
children leave their parents’ home.
A household maximizes its utility if and only if:
• Its share of income devoted to housing service is equal to β : q∗(r) ·R(r) = β(Y −T (r))
• Its share of income devoted to composite good is equal to α : Z∗(r) = α(Y − T (r))
17We consider the cost associated with the trip duration as an actual loss of income.
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It is rational for the inhabitants to make their consumption of housing service tend to q∗(r).
Of course, an increase in housing consumption is authorized if and only if such an increase is
physically possible, i.e. if there is available housing at this location.
Changes in flat sizes cannot happen instantaneously, for instance because it takes "time" to
find a new place to live. The inertia of this mechanism is accounted for by the timescale τq.
Let Ψ(r) be the number of unoccupied dwellings at each location :
Ψ(r) = H(r)− q(r) · n(r) (A.4)
The dynamics of q(r) is given by :
dq(r)
dt
=
{
1
τq
(q∗(r)− q(r)) = 1
τq
(
β(Y−T (r))
R(r)
− q(r)
)
if Ψ(r) > 0 or q∗(r) < q(r)
0 if Ψ(r) = 0 and q∗(r) > q(r)
(A.5)
Appendix A.3. Moving throughout the city
Households can change locations: the ones living at location r may choose to stay or move
to another location. We assume they are willing to move when their local utility level u(r)
is under the average utility level u¯ throughout the city: households living at locations where
u(r) ≤ u¯ source are attracted to places where u(r) ≥ u¯.
Let w(r) be a weighting function18, which compares utility level u(r) to u¯. We can define :
• if u(r) ≤ u¯, m−(r) = w(r) · n(r) is the number of households willing to leave
• if u(r) ≥ u¯, m+(r) = w(r) ·Ψ(r) is the number of attractive unoccupied dwellings
We have now to take into account city population variation. We know at every time step the
population that the city should be POPexo , and the population in the simulated city is POP .
Let us define ∆ as the difference between the two populations: ∆ = POPexo − POP . Let us
suppose now that newcomers only choose to locate in areas where utility is bigger than u¯: the
total aggregated demand of dwellings is equal to:
D =
∫
u(r)<u¯
m−(r)dr + max(∆, 0) (A.6)
and the aggregated supply of dwellings:
S =
∫
u(r)<u¯
m+(r)dr −min(∆, 0) (A.7)
18We have chosen w(u) = 2pi arctan(α|u−u¯u¯ |) where α = 15% tan(pi2 .95%), so that w(u) ≥ 95% when the
difference between u and u¯ is bigger than 5% of u¯.
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There is a priori no reason why the demand for moves should equal the supply of available
housing. The relationships giving the moves µ(r) meet these physical constraints :
µ(r) =
{
m+(r) ·min(1, D/S) if u(r) > u
m−(r) ·min(1, S/D) if u(r) ≤ u (A.8)
As for changes in flat sizes, moves of households cannot happen instantaneously. The inertia
of this mechanism is accounted for by the timescale τn.
The number of households living at location r evolves according to the moves:
dn(r)
dt
=
1
τn
µ(r) (A.9)
Appendix A.4. Rent curve dynamics
Rent level R(r) evolves in reaction to local supply and demand of housing service H(r).
Demand is expressed by the number of households n(r) living at this location and consuming
an amount of housing service q(r), and by the number of households willing to move to or from
this location:
• Rent level decreases if demand is lower than local supply, that is, if existing buildings are
not fully occupied.
• If buildings at location r are fully occupied, rent levels increase if inhabitants want to
increase their consumption of housing service, or if there are outside households willing
to move to this location.
The orders of magnitude of these evolutions are determined by the relative difference between
local demand and supply of housing service. Moreover, we assume that, for institutional rea-
sons19, housing rents do not clear the housing market instantaneously. The inertia of rent levels
evolution is characterized in the model by the timescale τR.
Landlords decrease their rents when all dwellings are not occupied, and increase them when
demand is bigger than dwelling supply. Let
n∗(r) = n(r) + max(µ(r), 0) + nvirtual(r) (A.10)
be the number of households living or willing to leave at a certain location in the city. It
is the sum of the number of inhabitants living at this location n(r), the number of households
about to move to this location max(µ(r), 0), and the number of households, nvirtual(r), who
would like to live in this location, but cannot because there are not enough available dwellings.
19For instance in France, when there is no tenant change, rent can only change significantly every three years.
32
Let us define the number of dwellings in the attractive locations by :
m+rent(r) =
{
w(r) · H(r)
q(r)
when u(r) > u¯
0 when u(r) ≤ u¯ (A.11)
and its aggregated sum over the whole city :
Srent =
∫
u(r)>u¯
m+rent(r)dr (A.12)
To calculate the pressure on the housing market, we have to distribute, over the various
locations, households who would like to move but cannot. We spread them over all attractive
locations, in proportion to the number of dwellings at each place, we get :
nvirtual(r) = m
+
rent(r).max(1,
D − S
Srent
) (A.13)
and then :
n∗(r) = n(r) + max(µ(r), 0) +m+rent(r) ·max(1,
D − S
Srent
) (A.14)
n∗(r) can be different from the actual number of dwellings H(r)
q(r)
. Anticipating that rents
have an impact on dwelling size q(r), but taking n∗(r) and H(r) as given, we can compute the
rent R∗(r) which adjusts dwelling size so that the number of dwellings becomes equal to n∗(r):
R∗(r) = β
(Y − T (r))
H(r)
n∗(r) (A.15)
If a location is attractive, and more people want to live there,R∗(r) will be bigger thanR(r).
On the contrary, if some dwellings are empty, R∗(r) will be lower than R(r). We suppose that
landowners vary their rents to set them equal to R∗(r), with the timescale τR:
dR(r)
dt
=
R∗(r)−R(r)
τR
=
1
τR
(
β
(Y − T (r))
H(r)
n∗(r)−R(r)
)
(A.16)
Appendix A.5. Housing production function
Buildings depreciate, and are renewed or rebuilt by land owners in reaction to rental prof-
itability. We suppose that some of them have a myopic behavior: they make investment deci-
sions as if they were at a stationary state of equilibrium, and that some others make anticipa-
tions, and compares rents to rents that households would pay in an equilibrium state where all
locations would have the same utility u¯.
Housing H ′(r) is produced using land L′(r) and capital K ′(r). The housing production
function reads, in a classic way ([34, 60]):
H ′(r) = AL′(r)aK ′(r)b (A.17)
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where A, a and b are coefficients (a+ b = 1), H ′(r) the housing surface built, L′(r) the ground
surface occupied by the buildings and K ′(r) the financial capital used for construction. The
benefit of land owners reads therefore:
Π(r) = (R(r)−R0)H(r)′ − δK(r)′ (A.18)
Π(r) is the profit, δ represents the joined effect of real estate capital depreciation, annual
taxes payed by landowners on the real estate capital, and interest rate. Developers build to
maximize their profit: at each point of the metropolitan area they construct, i.e. choose K ′(r),
to maximize Π(r) under the constraint that H
′(r)
L′(r) ratio is limited by an urbanism constraint (see
detail in Section 3.1). The metropolitan area boundary is defined by a rent R0, below which it
is not profitable to build housing building (this value corresponds both to other use of the land
like agriculture and to the transaction cost in the building and renting process).
As for the other equations that we have presented, let us reason per unit of land: because
a+ b = 1, we get
H ′(r)
L′(r)
= A
(
K ′(r)
L′(r)
)b
(A.19)
So if we define H(r) = H ′(r)/L′(r) and K(r) = K ′(r)/L′(r), we have :
H(r) = A(K(r))b (A.20)
Developers seek to maximize their profits. Some of them have a myopic behavior: they
make investment decisions as if they were at a stationary state of equilibrium. This leads to the
optimal capital :
K∗myopic(r) = arg max
K(r)
(H(r)R(r)− δK(r)) (A.21)
= arg max
K(r)
(A(K(r))bR(r)− δK(r)) (A.22)
Some city landowners make anticipations, and compares current rents to rents that house-
holds would pay in an equilibrium state where all would have the same utility u¯:
Ranticipate(r) = α
αββ
(
Y − T (r)
u¯
) 1
β
(A.23)
This leads to the optimal capital:
K∗anticipate(r) = arg max
K(r)
(A(K(r))bRanticipate(r)− δK(r)) (A.24)
We suppose that half of the the land owners are myopic, and half make anticipations, which
leads to an amount of capital:
K∗(r) =
K∗myopic(r) +K
∗
anticipate(r)
2
(A.25)
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Let us define H∗(r) = A ·K∗(r)b the corresponding optimal housing quantity.
Construction and building depreciation take time. We suppose that financial investments are
transformed into buildings with a time lag τH , which corresponds to the time required to achieve
the construction. We also suppose that a decrease inH(r) can happen through depreciation only,
with the timescale τdH . Housing quantity dynamics is therefore given by :
dH(r)
dt
=
{
H∗(r)−H(r)
τH
= AK
∗(r)b−H(r)
τH
if H∗(r) ≥ H(r)
−H(r)
τdH
if H∗(r) < H(r)
(A.26)
Appendix B. Data and coefficients
Table B.1 and B.2 present the numerical data we used in our simulations. In absence of
adequate data for some parameters, for instance the cost of time and construction costs, some
parameters have been calibrated on the Paris structure in 2008 ([29]). These calibrated parame-
ters are listed in tab. B.2.
The calibration of parameters τH , τn, τR and τq is particularly difficult. In this analysis,
we assume that the timescale of population density and rents evolution is 3 year, whereas for
dwelling size evolution it is 20 years. We also assume that building construction takes approx-
imately 2 years. We have therefore chosen τR = τn = 3 years, τq = 20 years and τH = 2
years.
Similarly, it is difficult to assess the depreciation rate τdH of Paris buildings. We use here a
depreciation timescale of 100 years (consistent with Wilhelmsson [61], for instance).
Considering the uncertainty in these parameters, we carried out a sensitivity analysis, vary-
ing each parameter independently, or simultaneously. We found that the qualitative results and
order of magnitude presented in this paper are unchanged within a broad range of values (e.g.,
from 1 month to 20 years for τH , τn and τR, from 1 month to 100 years for τq , and from 50 to
200 years for τdH).
Appendix B.1. Maximum floor-area ratio in the center of Paris
Data lead to 1.5 as the value of the maximum floor-area ratio in the center of Paris. This
value may seem low as most buildings in Paris have approximately 6 floors, which would induce
a ratio of about 6 at the center of Paris. However, our ratio is only taking into account housing
surface, and not the total built surface, and the discrepancy is simply caused by built surface
intended for purposes other than housing (it includes, on the one hand, corridors and lobbies in
buildings dedicated to housing and, on the other hand, all buildings not dedicated to housing:
offices, shops, museums, train stations, office buildings, schools, universities, etc.).
Appendix B.2. Construction costs in 2008
The calibration process provides construction costs between 1173e /m2 for a floor-area ratio
of 2 and 794e /m2 for a ratio of 1. We compare in Fig. B.1 the calibrated costs to construction
cost estimates from the Centre Scientifique et Technique du Bâtiment (CSTB), a French public
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Main Data
Urban area population French census figures for Paris urban area un-
til 2008 and demographic scenario for 2009-
2100 (Section 4.2).
Households average income Households disposable income (Source: IN-
SEE and J. Friggit) until 2008 and techno-
economic scenario for 2009-2100 (Section
4.1).
Fraction of ground surface devoted to hous-
ing
Source: Corine Land Cover. In places where
building is possible, the maximum fraction of
ground surface devoted to housing is 62%
Maximum floor-area ratio in the center of
Paris
1.5 (Appendix B.1)
Transport times in Paris urban area Data used in [62]
Public and private transport prices Data used in [48] until 2008 and techno-
economic scenario for 2009-2100 (Section
4.1). We only deal here with perceived travel
cost, and not with real travel cost which
would also include vehicle amortization.
Interest rate δ = 5%
Built capital depreciation time τdH = 100 years
Dwelling size evolution time constant τq = 20 years
Rent evolution time constant τR = 3 years
Population density evolution time constant τn = 3 years
Housing stock evolution time constant τH = 2 years
Table B.1: Summary of main input data
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Calibrated parameters
Households utility function parameter (Ap-
pendix A)
α = 0.7
Coefficients of construction cost function
(Appendix A)
A = 2.0140 and a = 0.36 in 2008 (Appendix
B.2). Coefficient A evolves proportionally to
(income)−(1−a)
Cost associated with travel time cf. Appendix B.3
Rent determining city border R0 = 12e /m2 in 2008, and evolution pro-
portional to income.
Logit factor used to compare different trans-
port modes at each location
factor = 4
Table B.2: Summary of calibration parameters
institution providing analysis and research on construction and housing issues. These data are
partial, since they are prices announced by developers in several public procurement documents
and in various estimates of building construction costs, as well as technical documents. What
emerges from CSTB data is an average cost of construction of 1200 e /m2 before tax, or ap-
proximately 1400 e /m2 including all taxes, which increases slightly as the building becomes
higher. However, these estimates are quite uncertain: because of the diversity of types of build-
ings that it is possible to build, it is difficult to obtain a cost that can be used as a reference cost.
The order of magnitude of the calibrated cost seems to agree with the order of magnitude of the
data. These data present however a less convex profile than calibrated data. An explanation of
the discrepancy may be that the so-called “actual" costs in CSTB data are direct construction
costs, while in reality developers consider also additional costs when the height of buildings
increases ([63]). These additional costs include administrative costs (building permits etc.), fi-
nancial costs (the risk associated with a larger investment cost), and technical costs (duration
and technical difficulty of the works), which may introduce more convexity in the real cost
curve.
Appendix B.3. Cost of time in 2008
In the model, rents (per surface unit) decrease when moving away from the center of Paris
because households have to pay a generalized transportation cost, which is the sum of a per-
ceived monetary cost (interpreted here as the cost of fuel) and of the cost associated with trans-
port time, assuming that households do a round-trip per day towards the center of Paris. In the
simulation, cost associated with transport time represents generally the bigger part of general-
ized cost, and the way we assess this cost has an important role in our results.
Numerous studies have dealt with this issue, but no conclusive result exists on this complex
subject. In Ile-de-France, French Government’s Strategic Analysis Center proposed to use net
hourly wage as an estimate for commuting time cost, but explained that the value of actual
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Figure B.1: Construction costs
commuting time cost depends greatly on several factors such as households characteristics or
modal choice ([64]).
Due to the importance of time cost choice in the simulation, we calibrated time cost instead
of using an a priori fixed value. We computed this cost using our data on rent spatial distri-
bution: out of these data, assuming our model perfectly exact, it is indeed possible to estimate
a theoretical generalized transportation cost. Assuming that this generalized cost reflects the
sum of the direct cost of transport and of the cost associated with transport time, and assuming
that households do a round-trip per day towards the center of Paris, the transport time cost was
estimated as a function of journey time.
Marginal time cost seems to decrease with travel time, and we chose to model simply this
decrease using a piecewise affine function. This representation leads us to use a cost time worth
105% of the net hourly wage when the travel time is less than 25 min (or, equivalently, when the
distance to the center of Paris is less than 15 km), then a very low cost (6.6% of the net hourly
wage) for portions of journey in excess of this limit. The value of time for journeys during less
than 25 min is therefore very close to commuting time cost in Ile de France according to French
Government’s Strategic Analysis Center.
This observed decrease in marginal time cost can be attributed to the limits of our approach,
in particular to the monocentric framework and to the hypothesis that households do a round-
trip per day towards the center of Paris. In the real world, in places where travel time exceeds
25 minutes, a large fraction of households do not commute to the center of Paris. This leads to
a shorter average trip length than in the mono-centric case, and using actual average trip length
would enable to use more realistic time cost values and smaller total fuel costs for locations far
from Paris city center. In absence of needed data, we did not take into account explicitly this
variation in trip length, and modeled it with a non-linear time cost.
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Appendix C. Link between Imaclim-R outputs and NEDUM-2D inputs
Local and global variables. In this study, four quantified evolutions are driving NEDUM model
simulations: households average income evolution, city total population evolution, public trans-
port price evolution, and private transport price evolution (cf. Sec. 4).
These variables describe evolutions taking place in Paris urban area, and are therefore local.
An important question which arises when downscaling global scenarios is when should these
local driving variables be consistent with global evolutions, i.e. when should local evolutions
be determined by global evolutions, or when is it more interesting to consider that they are
independent.
Here, we suppose that income, and transport prices evolutions are driven by global evolu-
tions, whereas urban area total population is independent. As Imaclim-R is disaggregated into
12 regions, one of them being EU-27 and Turkey as a unique region, this means that we only
consider scenarios in which Paris will inevitably follow locally decarbonisation and vehicle
electrification trends determined by the model for this entire “Europe + Turkey” region. Con-
versely, world population growth in Imaclim-R are disconnected from Paris assumption from
INSEE and the UN.20
What should be determined by local scenarios, or what should be independent, depends on
the questions which one wants to address. Our choice was motivated by the fact that we did
not aim here to analyze local policies influencing private vehicle technology choice in Paris
(such as, for instance, local taxes dependent on households vehicle technology). We also did
not consider specifically how local land-use policies could impact income levels. However,
designing and assessing new local transport price or income scenarios disconnected from global
scenarios would enable to study theses issues, and would be an interesting development from
our work.
Imaclim-R / NEDUM-2D linkage. Imaclim-R provides many outputs, including for instance oil
prices (cf. Fig. 5), but only three are used here in NEDUM-2D simulations : private vehicle
usage cost per km, public transport usage cost per km and household income.
As Imaclim-R simulates averages over the entire Europe, we do not directly use Imaclim-R
outputs in NEDUM-2D simulations. We suppose that, from 2009 on, NEDUM-2D input data
evolve proportionally to Imaclim-R outputs. Input values until 2008 are therefore historical
values, whereas values after 2009 are historical value in 2008, multiplied by the ratio between
Imaclim-R value in that year over Imaclim-R value in 2008.
Table C.1 shows examples of the range of transport prices, households income and total
population values used in NEDUM-2D simulations for two timesteps.
20Rigoroursly speaking, world population growth in Imaclim-R is driven by demographic scenarios inspired by
the UN, but, depending on the simulation, demographic scenario choice in Imaclim-R can be the same or can be
different from UN scenario choice underlying demographic scenario in Paris urban area.
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2050 2100
SN LN SY LY SN LN SY LY
Average cost to drive 1km in private
vehicle, including electric vehicles
and carbon tax (e /km)*
8.1 9.7 8.2 10 6.9 6.4 5.2 6.6
Monthly cost of basic public trans-
port pass (or equivalent), including
carbon tax (e /month)*
50 73 48 74 52 52 38 45
Average annual household dispos-
able income (ke /year)*
129 133 129 132 315 221 272 220
Low scenario High scenario Low scenario High scenario
Population** 6 370 000 6 370 000 5 610 000 6 370 000
* See Fig. 6 for other years.
** See Fig. 7 for other years.
Table C.1: NEDUM-2D model input data for years 2050 and 2100. Average cost to drive, monthly cost of public
transport pass and annual household disposable income are computed based on Imaclim-R corresponding out-
puts. Population evolution scenarios are independent from Imaclim-R outputs and parameters. Data for each year
between 2008 and 2100 are plotted in Fig. 6 and 7.
Appendix D. The IMACLIM-R parameters
The Imaclim-R global scenarios are part of the 576 scenarios designed for Rozenberg et al.
[47].
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Assumption 1 (LN and
LY scenarios)
Assumption 2 (SN and SY
scenarios)
Oil and
gas
markets
Oil
Amount of ultimately recoverable resources (total con-
ventional and non conventional)***
3.6 Tb 3.1Tb
Inertia in the deployment of non conventionals (spread of
the bell-shaped curve for each field)
no inertia (b=0.061) inertia (b=0.041)
Maximum growth rate of Middle-East capacities 0.8Mbd/year 0.7Mbd/year
Remaining resources before depletion starts 25% 50%
Gas Indexation of gas price on oil price Until 80$/bl Always indexed
OPEC behav-
ior
Target oil price 40$/bl 80$/bl
Coal
Price growth elasticity to production decrease 1.5 1
Price growth elasticity to production increase 1 4
Production growth rate which cancels out price growth rate 2% 0,05%
Power
generation
decarbonization
Nuclear Maximum market shares [min - max]** [2.5% - 20%] [5% - 40%]
Renewables Maximum market share of renewables 15% 25%
Learning rate for renewables investment costs 3% 7%
Carbon
capture
and
storage
CCS learning rate 7% 13%
CCS start date 2015 2010
CCS “bottleneck phase” 10 years 7 years
CCS maximum market share at the end of the bottleneck
phase
3.5% 5%
CCS growth phase 8 years 8 years
CCS maximum market share at the end of the growth phase 63% 90%
CCS maturation phase 8 years 8 years
CCS maximum market share at the end of the maturation
phase
70% 100%
Low
carbon
end-use
technologies
Electric
vehicles
EV start No significant market pen-
etration
EV "bottleneck phase" 3 years
EV maximum market share at the end of the phase 2.5%
EV growth phase 15 years
EV maximum market share at the end of the phase 45%
EV maturation phase 16 years
EV maximum market share 50%
Industry Capital lifetime in the industry 30 years 20 years
Energy
efficiency
Freight energy consumption 1 Trend extracted from
POLES data: starts at 1
reaches 1.1 in 2030 and
stays at 1.1 until 2100
Freight fuel consumption elasticity to fuel prices -0.35 -0.4
Buildings energy consumption per m2* Trend which starts at 1,
reaches 1.2 in 2030 and
stays at 1.2 until 2100
1
The parameters in bold are multiple parameters.
* different parameters according to the region.
** different parameters according to the region and horizontal slice in the annual monotonous load curve (between base load and peak load).
*** different parameters according to the region and category of oil.
Table D.1: Parameters of the Imaclim-R global scenarios (see Rozenberg et al. [47]).
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Assumption 1 (LN and
LY scenarios)
Assumption 2 (SN and SY
scenarios)
Alternative
liquid fuel
supply
Biofuels Time scale of reactive anticipation for biofuels production 6 years 4 years
Biofuels supply: multiplier coefficient of the supply curves
for the default value)
Value from IEA curves 50% increase w.r.t Assump-
tion 1 value
Coal-to-
liquids
Oil price threshold for CTL production start 200 $/bl 120 $/bl
Time scale of reactive anticipation for CTL production 8 years 0
Maximum production growth in 2030, 2035 and in 2050 0.05 Mbd - 0.10 Mbd -
0.10 Mbd
0.20 Mbd - 1.5 Mbd -
3 Mbd
Development
patterns
Transport Motorization rate growth with GDP per capita* 50% increase w.r.t As-
sumption 2 value
Value from IEA data
Buildings
Income elasticity of buildings stock growth 1 0.7
Asymptote to surface per capita in China and India 60 40
Start year and fuel price for a forced decline of oil consump-
tion in this sector
2020 - 1300$/tep 2010 - 1000$/tep
Industrial
goods
households industrial goods consumption saturation
level [min-max]*(multiplier factor of the calibration year
consumption volume)
[1.5-3] [1-2]
The parameters in bold are multiple parameters.
* different parameters according to the region.
Table D.2: (End of tab. D.1) Parameters of the Imaclim-R global scenarios (see Rozenberg et al. [47]).
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